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Oregon's Hearing Officer Panel
By Thomas E. Ewing, Chief Hearing Officer*
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 2000 Oregon and Michigan became the newest
states in the nation to establish independent central panels of
administrative law judges. For Oregon, the effort began twenty years
ago. Various attempts to create a central panel were met with agency
hostility and legislative indifference. However, legislative
indifference changed dramatically when the confidence in the
fairness of agency adjudication was shaken. Champions emerged,
urging the formation of an independent judiciary of administrative
law judges. Agencies fiercely resisted, predicting that their policy-
making role would be usurped, their expertise ignored, and their
budgets broken.' It is a familiar story.2
* Thomas E. Ewing is the Chief Hearing Officer of the Hearing Officer Panel,
appointed on August 31, 1999. The author thanks (in alphabetical order) John W.
Hardwicke, formerly Chief Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative
Hearings, Maryland; David W. Heynderickx (see infra note 1); Julian Mann, III,
Chief Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings, North
Carolina; and Rep. Lane Shetterly of the Oregon General Assembly and sponsor of
House Bill 2525, for their review of and comments on this article.
1. The history of Oregon's central panel has been ably chronicled by senior
deputy legislative counsel to the Oregon Legislature, David W. Heynderickx.
David W. Heynderickx, Finding Middle Ground: Oregon experiments with a
central panel for contested case proceedings, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 219, 219-63
(2000). Heynderickx attended the meetings of the study group and provided
legislative drafting services as House Bill 2525 evolved.
2. For the history of other state central panels, see George R. Coan,
Operational Aspects of a Central Hearing Examiners Pool: California's
Experiences, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 86 (1975); Jeffrey G. Cokin & Jonathan
Mallamud, Hearing Officers in Pennsylvania: Recommendations for an
Independent Central Office, 15 DUQ. L. REV. 605 (1977); Mark A. Dickerson, The
Georgia Office of State Administrative Hearings, 19 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L.
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House Bill 2525, creating Oregon's Hearing Officer Panel
(Panel), was the result.3 It has been described as "probably the most
significant modification to Oregon's Administrative Procedures Act
(APA) since the law was adopted in 1957. ''4 This article traces the
JUDGES 121 (1999); William R. Dorsey, Florida's Continuing Experiment with the
Central Hearing Panel Process: The Division of Administrative Hearings, 15 J.
NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 77 (1995); Edwin L. Felter, Jr., The Hidden
Executive Branch Judiciary: Colorado's Central Panel Experience -- Lessons for
the Feds, 14 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 95 (1994); James F. Flanagan,
Report to the Judicial Council on the Administrative Law Judge Statute, 18 J.
NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 371 (1998) (on South Carolina); John W.
Hardwicke, The Central Hearing Agency: Theory and Implementation in
Maryland, 14 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 5 (1994) [hereinafter Hardwcike,
The Central Hearing Agency]; Duane R. Harves, Making .Administrative
Proceedings More Efficient and Effective: How the ALI Central Panel System
Works in Minnesota, 65 JUDICATURE 257 (1981); Daniel R. E. Jordan, Opening the
Floodgates of Decision-Making at the Missouri Administrative Hearing
Commission, 15 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 99 (1995); Marvin Kittrell,
ALJs in South Carolina, 7 S. CAROLINA LAW. 42 (May/June 1996); Julian Mann,
III, Striving for Efficiency in Administrative Litigation: North Carolina's Office of
Administrative Hearings, 15 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 221 (1995); Julian
Mann, III, Administrative Justice: No Longer Just A Recommendation, 79 N.C. L.
Rev. 1639 (2001); Christoper B. McNeil, Due Process and the Ohio Administrative
Procedure Act: The Central Panel Proposal, 23 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 783 (1997);
William B. Swent, South Carolina's ALl: Central Panel, Administrative Court, or
a Little of Both?, 48 S.C. L. REV. 1 (1996). Sheila Bailey Taylor, The Growth and
Development of a Centralized Administrative Hearings Process in Texas, 17 J.
NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 113 (1997).
For central panels generally, see John W. Hardwicke, The Central Panel
Movement: A Work in Progress, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 419 (2001) [hereinafter
Hardwcike, The Central Panel Movement]; Allen C. Hoberg, Administrative
Hearings: State Central Panels in the 1990s, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 75 (1994),
reprinted in 14 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 107 (1994); Allen C. Hoberg,
Ten Years Later:. The Progress of State Central Panels, J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L.
JUDGES 235 (2001); Harold Levinson, The Central Panel System: A Framework
That Separates AI~s from Administrative Agencies, 65 JUDICATURE 236 (1981);
Malcolm Rich, Central Panels of Administrative Law Judges: An Introduction, 65
JUDICATURE 233 (1981); Malcolm Rich, Adapting the Central Panel System: A
Study of Seven States, 65 JUDICATURE 246 (1981); Victor Rosenblum, The Central
Panel System: Enhancing Administrative Justice, 65 JUDICATURE 235 (1981).
3. H.R. 2525, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999).
4. Heynderickx, supra note 1, at 220. Oregon's APA may be found at OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 310-550 (1999). The central panel movement has been described as
the "fourth reform movement in state administrative law." Michael Asimow, The
history of Oregon's Hearing Officer Panel, with special emphasis on
its operations since January 1, 2000. Every state has a story to tell;
Oregon's is not over yet. House Bill 2525 is due to sunset on June
30, 2005. 5 The Legislature must decide in 2003 whether or not to
make the Panel permanent or to allow its dissolution.
6
II. THE HISTORY OF HOUSE BILL 2525
Since 1946, with the passage of the federal Administrative
Procedures Act, there has been a movement in the United States to
separate agency regulation and enforcement from its adjudicatory
function.7  Proponents argue that there is, at a minimum, the
appearance of irregularity when an administrative law judge (ALJ) 8
employed by the agency judicially reviews the agency's action; at
worst, there is the reality of improper agency influence. The
solution, proponents believe, is to transfer agency ALJs into an
independent central panel.9 The first such central panel was created
Forth Reform: Introduction to the Administrative Law Review on State
Administrative Law, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 395, 398 (2001).
5. H.R. 4053, 71st Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Or. 2002). The Panel was originally
scheduled to sunset on January 1, 2004. The reason for the extension was to
relieve budget analysts in the Department of Administrative Services from the
burden of preparing two budgets for all agencies subject to the Panel (Oregon
budgets on a biennial basis): one if the sunset provision is rescinded and the Panel
becomes permanent; the other if the provision is not rescinded and the Panel
dissolves.
6. H.R. 4053, 71st Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Or. 2002).
7. John Hardwicke's article, The Central Panel Movement nicely synthesizes
the driving forces both behind and against state central panels. Hardwicke, The
Central Panel Movement, supra note 2.
8. Although House Bill 2525 uses the term "hearing officer," the designation
"administrative law judge" is favored in this article because it has gained common
currency both in central panels generally and in the federal administrative judiciary.
9. See Heynderickx, supra note 1, at 223-232 for a thorough discussion of the
arguments advanced both by proponents and opponents of central panels. Edward
J. Schoenbaum points out the public perception that ALJs not in central panels are
biased in their adjudicative responsibilities because they are hired, promoted,
supervised, and paid by the very agencies whose orders they review. Edward J.
Schoenbaum, Improving Public Trust & Confidence in Administrative
Adjudications: What Administrative Law Practitioners, Judges, and Academicians
Can Do, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 575,579 (2001).
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in California in 1946. There are now twenty five state panels in the
nation. 10
Efforts in Oregon to establish a central panel go back to the
early 1980s. In 1983, 1985, and 1987, bills were introduced to create
an "administrative hearings office" with a director appointed by the
governor. The Oregon Association of Administrative Law Judges
(OAALJ) was the moving force behind them all. None of the judges
ever received a hearing." In 1987 the Legislature did, however,
authorize the creation of a Commission on Administrative Hearings
to study the "structures and procedures by which agencies conduct
contested case proceedings, including matters relating to
centralization."' 12 Over the next couple of years the Commission
engaged in extensive fact-finding, receiving testimony from a variety
of sources. Agency heads were the "most vociferous critics" of the
central panel concept. 13 They argued that a panel would deprive
them of needed hearing officer expertise; that agencies, not hearing
officers, are ultimately accountable for the impartiality of hearings;
and that hearing officers, free of agency control, would begin setting
agency priorities and policies.' 4
The Commission accepted the agency argument, concluding
that a central panel of hearing officers was not needed: "Agencies
must be able to interpret, modify, and create their own policies.
Turning that authority over to the hearing officer would abdicate
responsibility which has been delegated through the political
process."15 The Commission acknowledged some problems with the
current system and recommended an "incremental approach" to
improvement. The approach included the following provisions:
hearing officers should disclose ex parte contacts; agencies should
justify the modification or reversal of findings of historical facts in
their final orders; hearing officers should apply agency policy but be
permitted to comment on that policy if it is contrary to law or
produces unjust results; agencies should be encouraged to share
10. Hardwicke, The Central Panel Movement, supra note 2, at 441-42.
11. Heynderickx, supra note 1, at 238-39.
12. Id. at 239.
13. OREGON STATE BAR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ADMINISTRATIVE
HEARINGS, 6 (1989) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
14. Id. at 6-8.
15.Id. at 11.
hearing officers in order to produce efficiencies; a code of
professional conduct should be established for hearing officers
(written by the Department of Justice); and the title of "hearing
officer" should be changed to "administrative law judge."' 6  The
Commission's report, including all of its recommendations, was
ignored by the Legislative Assembly.
The central panel issue was reawakened in 1995. There was
considerable legislative discontent over interference by the Director
of the Department of Revenue in ALJ decisions, particularly when
the Department lost their hearings."7 The politics became white-hot,
with ALJs, fearing Department retribution, refusing to testify before
the Legislature unless they did so under subpoena. The legislative
solution was to place them in a specially created Tax Magistrate
Division within the Oregon Tax Court.'
8
There was now new momentum for the creation of a central
panel. In 1997 Senator Neil Bryant and Representative Lane
Shetterly, both attorneys, sponsored House Bill 2948.'9 They
objected to agency interference in hearing decisions, done in order to
ensure compliance with agency "policy;" they wanted to improve
both the quality and timeliness of orders; and they were concerned
about the degree of familiarity between ALJs and assistant attorneys
general. 20  House Bill 2948 proposed to establish an office of
administrative hearings, headed by a director appointed by the
governor with Senate confirmation for a four-year term.21 House Bill
2948 would have consolidated the hearing units of five agencies,
with forty one employees. 22
16. Id. at 12-29.
17. Telephone interview with Neil Bryant, Senator (April 20, 2001);
Heynderickx, supra note 1, at 240.
18. Heynderickx, supra note 1, at 240-41.
19. H.R. 2948, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997).
20. Interview with Neil Bryant, supra note 17.
21. H.R. 2948, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997).
22. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL OFFICE FOR H.R. 2948, FISCAL ANALYSIS OF
PROPOSED LEGISLATION 1 (May 5, 1997) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE FISCAL OFFICE
FOR H.R. 2948]. House Bill 2948 borrowed heavily from the MODEL ACT
CREATING A STATE CENTRAL PANEL HEARING AGENCY (1997), reprinted in
Christopher B. McNeil, The Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency:
Promises, Practical Problems, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW REVIEW 475, app. at 541-49 (2001); see also Ed Schoenbaum, A brief History
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Testimony before the House Judiciary Committee was sharply
divided. Members of the Oregon State Bar strongly favored the bill.
The representative of the Oregon Litigation Reform Coalition,
representing business interests, stated: "I can tell you from
experience that many parties who appear before agencies in contested
cases feel the deck is stacked against them. And why shouldn't they?
How would you feel if the party investigating making a charge
against you was also empowered to decide your fate?
' 23
Private practitioners testified to the difficulty of persuading
clients that they could expect a fair hearing before an employee of the
very agency whose order the client was appealing.2
4
Agency response was quite different. Not surprisingly, the
chief roadblock to the creation of central panels in almost every state
has been the objections raised by executive branch agencies.25 For
example, the Commissioner of the Real Estate Agency complained
about the following: the agency had not budgeted for the increased
hearing costs (the Commissioner himself heard all real estate cases);
it would be difficult to find ALJs with real estate expertise; assistant
attorney general costs would increase because of the additional
testimony needed "to educate the hearing officers"; and hearings
would be delayed. He concluded that "[t]he Agency has an excellent
track record both in the decisions of the contested case hearings and
results of the appeals process. There appears to be no savings, only
expense, and no documented benefit to the consumer and
licensees. '26
Reaction from other agencies-especially the smaller licensing
boards that traditionally had used their own board members,
of the Model Act to Create a State Central Hearing Agency, 17 J. NAT'L ASS'N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 309 (1997).
23. Hearing on H.R. 2948 Before the Civil Law Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997) (testimony of John
DiLorenzo, Jr., attorney) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 2948].
24. Id. (testimony of Janice Krem, attorney, and Gary P. Harrell, Harrell &
Nester, LLP).
25. Hardwicke, The Central Panel Movement, supra note 2, at 423.
26. Hearing on H.R. 2948, supra note 23 (written testimony of Scott Taylor,
Commissioner, Real Estate Agency). Interestingly, the Commissioner testified that
in 1996 he had heard eighteen contested case hearings. Id. The agency prevailed
in all of them. Id.
administrators, or contract hearing officers27 to preside over
contested case hearings--was quick and similar. The President of the
Board of Optometry argued that it was more efficient and less costly
for the Board to use its own members to preside over licensing cases
because they are "already familiar with optometry and the nature of
the type of complaints that go to contested case hearings." 28 The
Board of Chiropractic Examiners also requested that it be excluded
from House Bill 2948: "The Board's professional expertise is relevant
and necessary in the proper drafting of a board order."29 If there is a
factual error, the Board will have to incur additional attorney general
costs in appealing the case to the Court of Appeals, where a
correction in the findings of fact can be made. 30
The stiffest opposition came from the Governor himself. He
was concerned that the bill would create a "new and powerful"
bureaucracy within state government, able to direct state policy in
significant ways and, as stated by his legal counsel, "answerable
neither to the Governor, nor to agency heads, nor even to the General
Assembly." 3' He expressed suspicion that the instances of improper
agency influence on ALJs were more likely the exception than the
rule. "The bill, in short, is not a sound policy choice, for it will make
government less accountable, more cumbersome in complex cases,
27. Employment of contract hearing officers is probably preferable to using
board members or agency administrators to ensure an impartial hearing, but barely.
Early in the life of the Panel, a couple of agency heads urgently requested
permission from the Chief Hearing Officer to use their former hearing officers.
Although the requests were denied, those conversations certainly provided support
for the suspicion, expressed by two commentators, that agencies hire contract
hearing officers with certain outcomes in mind, and that these hearing officers
"tend" to rule in favor of agencies in order to increase their chances of being hired
in the future. See Cokin & Mallamud, supra note 2, at 621..
.28. E-mail from David Plunket, to Rep. Lane Shetterly (Mar. 26, 1997) (on file
with author).
29. Hearing on H.R. 2948, supra note 23 (written testimony of Bethanne
Darby, Policy Analyst of the Oregon Board of Chiropractic Examiners).
30. Id.
31. John Hardwicke has observed that most objections to the creation of a
central panel--however expressed--turn ultimately on a fear of a "new, gigantic
bureaucracy, a semi-judicial replacement of the independent, expert agency."
Hardwicke, The Central Hearing Agency, supra note 2, at 48. Oregon's experience
supports the accuracy of Hardwicke's observation.
Spring 2003 Oregon's Hearing Officer Panel
64 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 23-1
less exact when technical expertise is required, and will increase
litigation in an already litigious process." 32
Notwithstanding agency opposition, and in the face of a likely
veto, the House of Representatives passed House Bill 2948 by a vote
of 39 to 20, and the Senate by a vote of 20 to 3.33 The Governor did
veto the bill, although his message was milder than the remarks
delivered earlier through his legal counsel. He expressed support for
the "idea of independent hearings officers who can provide a fair
hearing for citizens who want to affect agency decisions.
34
However, in his mind, the bill had not adequately provided for a
funding mechanism. He was also concerned about its ex parte
provisions, which "are too much like a legal trial and less like a more
informal setting for citizens to be heard by their government."
35
Finally, he doubted the truth of the perception that ALJs, employed
by agencies, are biased and cannot be fair to citizens.36 Nevertheless,
he was prepared to work for the reform of administrative hearings.
To that end, he declared his intention to create an interim study
group-comprised of legislators, ALJs, agency heads, and members
of the Department of Justice-to recommend changes to the current
system.37
The core of the study group created by the Governor consisted
of Representative Lane Shetterly, Chair of the Interim House
Judiciary Committee; H. Henry "Chip" Lazenby, Governor's Legal
Counsel; and David Schuman, Deputy Attorney General. This group,
meeting with agency representatives, administrative law judges, and
others, toiled through 1998 and into 1999.38 The House Bill 2525
emerged from these discussions, 39 sponsored at the request of the
Governor by Representative Lane Shetterly, and Senators Neil
Bryant and Kate Brown.
32. Hearing on H.R. 2948, supra note 23 (testimony of H. Henry Lazenby,
Governor's Legal Counsel).
33. Heynderickx, supra note 1, at 243.
34. Governor's Office Veto Message, to Phil Keisling, Secretary of State, H.R.




38. Heynderickx, supra note 1, at 243.
39. H.R. 2525, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999).
Agencies were no more happy with this bill than with House
Bill 2948, although reaction was more muted than in 1997, perhaps
because of the Governor's support.4' But there were still loud and
hostile voices, particularly from real estate brokers (regulated by the
Real Estate Agency) and building contractors (regulated by the
Construction Contractors Board).4' Despite this opposition, the
"truly remarkable characteristic" of the legislative progress of House
Bill 2525 was the support of the key players: the Governor, the
Attorney General, the chairs of both the Senate and House Judiciary
Committees (Senator Bryant and Representative Lane Shetterly
respectively), and powerful business interests.42 "[I]t was clear that
the time had come for a central hearing panel in Oregon.,, 43 The
Oregon Legislature passed the bill and the Governor signed it into
law. 44  The Hearing Officer Panel (Panel) became operational on
January 1, 2000.45
III. HOUSE BILL 2525
A. Structure of the Hearing Officer Panel
The single issue that had bedeviled previous efforts to create a
central panel in Oregon was cost.46 House Bill 2948 (as was the case
with previous bills proposing to create central panels) had
contemplated the establishment of an independent, stand-alone
agency with an annual budget of $5.1 million for the 1997-99
biennium. It was projected that the office would require an
additional 18.5 employees in addition to those transferred from the
hearing units of the affected agencies. These new employees would
perform all the support functions required by an agency, such as
personnel and information technology. The total additional net cost
to the state was estimated to be $1.96 million; of that, $1.0 million




44. Id. at 219.
45. H.R. 2525, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999).
46. See Heynderickx, supra note 1, at 238.
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was for start-up costs, which could not be recovered by billing client
agencies but would have to come from the General Fund. Moreover,
because the agency had no cash reserves or fund balance, it would
require $2.5 million to ensure sufficient cash flow for personal
services, supplies, and capital outlay.47 The Governor had vetoed
this bill, largely because of cost.
4 8
With this history very much in mind, cost was the first issue
addressed by the study group.49 It made three key decisions. 50 The
first was to place the central panel in the Employment Department
rather than create a new agency.5' The second was to transfer to the
Employment Department not only the personnel but also the
associated operating budgets of those agencies whose hearing units
were now consolidated.52 And the third was to require those hearing
units to remain housed in their former agencies.
53
1. Housed in the Employment Department
Having decided that the Panel should be housed in an agency
in order to reduce costs, the question became: which one? The study
group preferred the Department of Administrative Services because it
conducted few hearings and provided general administrative support
to all state agencies.54 However, the department director was cool to
the idea.55 The group then revived the suggestion, first floated by the
1989 Commission on Administrative Hearings, 56 of making greater
use of the Employment Department. The Employment Department
provided hearing services on a contract basis for several other
47. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL OFFICE FOR H.R. 2948, supra note 22. The
Legislature appropriated from the General Fund $1.6 million to pay for
implementing House Bill 2948. H.R. 2948, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997).
48. See Governor's Office Veto Message, supra note 34.





54. Hearing on H.R. 2948, supra note 23 (testimony of H. Henry Lazenby,
Governor's Legal Counsel); see also Heynderickx, supra note 1, at 244.
55. Interview with Henry Lazenby (n.d.).
56. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 16.
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agencies, and already served as something of a mini-central panel.57
The Employment Department was selected as the host agency for the
panel, with the chief hearing officer appointed by its director and
serving at the director's pleasure.
58
2. Panel Structure
House Bill 2525 consolidated the hearings units of seven
different agencies under the Employment Department: Adult and
Family Services (13), Construction Contractors Board (6), Oregon
Liquor Control Commission (4), Water Resources Department (1),
Department of Transportation (46), Department of Consumer and
Business Services (6); and the hearings unit of the Employment
57. Heynderickx, supra note 1, at 244.
58. H.R. 2525, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999). Typically, central panels (a
division of an agency, rather than being independent, stand-alone agencies) are
housed in agencies requiring no hearing services from the Panel (e.g., Colorado,
Iowa, Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Wisconsin). Central Panel Overview,
prepared for the Hearing Officer Panel Oversight Committee (January 17, 2002)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Central Panel Overview]. Oregon is an exception.
Like many other compromises of the study group, the choice to house central
panels in agencies requiring no hearing services produced its own interesting
problems. Experience has taught, at least in Oregon and under administration of
the Employment Department prior to 2002, that conflicts of interest can occur
when a central panel is placed in an agency which itself is the largest user of
hearing services, especially without some statutory guarantee of the Panel's
independence. David Heynderickx recommends that the chief hearing officer be
appointed by the governor. Heynderickx, supra note 1, at 247. House Bill 2948
had provided for a director appointed for a four year term by the governor with
senate confirmation. H.R. 2948, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997). The Model
Central Panel Act recommends that the chief administrative law judge either be
appointed by the state's governor for a specific term or be appointed through the
civil service process and removable only for cause. McNeil, supra note 22, at 543.
The Model State Administrative Procedure Act proposes that the Panel be placed in
a "department," without identifying it. MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT, 15
U.L.A. § 4-301(a) (1981). The Commission's intent is to "place the office in the
most neutral possible organizational position, so as to maximize the independence
of the office." Id. Duane R. Harves severely criticized this proposal, arguing that
"[o]nly where the central panel is a totally separate and independent agency is true
independence achieved." Symposium, The 1981 Model State Administrative
Procedure Act: The Impact on Central Panel States, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 661,
665 (1984). He did, however, congratulate the Commission on recommending that
the director be appointed for a fixed term removable only for cause. Id.
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Department itself (43).59 In addition, the legislature appropriated
funds for eight new positions to operate the Panel: a chief hearing
officer, a secretary to the chief, two program technicians, a trainer, a
personnel officer, a budget officer, and an information technology
specialist. 60 The total number of Panel employees was 135.61
3. Physical Location of the Panel
When House Bill 2525 was passed, Panel employees were
housed in eleven different agency facilities located across the state
(twenty one ALJs were permanently "out-stationed" at home doing
telephone hearings-principally unemployment insurance and child
support cases). The study group recommended that these employees
remain where they were, a recommendation which would reduce the
fiscal effect of the bill.62  Presumably, this would also ease
dissolution of the Panel should it fail.
But this decision produced its own problems. From an
appearance point of view, it is questionable whether ALJs, now
independent, should remain in their offices located at their former
agencies. Each of the sending agencies had different computer
operating systems (e.g., Novell, Windows NT) servers, case
management systems, word processing applications, e-mail
programs, and Internet browsers. Panel-wide communication was
(and still is) difficult. Without a centralized docketing and
scheduling system, it is impossible to efficiently assign cases across
the lines of the former hearing units. Statistical data from the hearing
units has to be manually collected and keyed into a common
database. And finally, creation of a common identity and culture is
problematical.
4. Jurisdictional Scope of HB 2525
The study group spent a good deal of time discussing the
question of which agencies should or should not be exempted from
59. H.R. 2525, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999); see also Heynderickx, supra
note 1, at 248 n.150-52.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Heynderickx, supra note 1, at 244, 251.
House Bill 2525. Unlike House Bill 2948, which expressly named
all agencies subject to the bill, House Bill 2525 expressly named only
those that were excluded.63 This gave the Panel an enormous
jurisdictional breadth, encompassing the contested cases of almost
eighty agencies, including unemployment insurance, motor vehicle
licensing, social services (Medicaid, food stamps, etc.), licensing
boards and commissions, forestry, environmental quality, agriculture,
child support, and others. In 2002 the Panel issued 32,400 orders.
This represents perhaps ninety percent or more of all state contested
case orders issued in Oregon. 64
One criterion of exemption, much discussed by the study
group, was the distinction between agencies conducting "one-party"
cases and those conducting "two-party" cases. 65 In the former, an
agency takes disciplinary or enforcement action against a citizen by
suspending or revoking a license, imposing a penalty, and so forth.6 6
In the latter, at least in the study group's opinion, an agency performs
a "judicial" function, merely serving as a disinterested forum for
citizens to resolve disputes.67 The argument for including the latter
in the panel was less compelling because the dual role of
enforcement and adjudication was absent.68 Nevertheless, the group
decided not to adopt the distinction, in part for a fiscal reason-
63. H.R. 2525, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999) Henry Lazenby commented
that it was the Governor himself who was responsible for this philosophical
change. His position was: "If you want a central panel, you've got a central
panel."; see also Heynderickx, supra note 1, at 244.
Rep. Lane Shetterly noted that practical and political considerations governed
the choices: Agencies headed by elected officials (e.g., the secretary of state,
superintendent of public instruction, state treasurer, attorney general, labor
commissioner), or whose subject matter was regarded as too specialized (Public
Utilities Commission), or too political (Workers' Compensation Board) were
exempted; see also Heynderickx, supra note 1, at 248-49 n.153-54; cf. H.B. 2948, §
5 69th Leg. (Or. 1997).
Other agencies excluded are the Employment Relations Board (state, city, and
county employee labor disputes), Land Conservation and Development
Commission (land use), and the Bureau of Labor and Industries (civil rights). H.R.
2525, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999).
64. Data from Hearing Officer Panel (on file with the author).
65. Heynderickx, supra note 1, at 248 n.154
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 250 n.161-62.
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exempting agencies having "two-party" cases would have resulted in
fewer agencies sharing the cost of the panel.69
Rejecting the distinction was wise for other reasons as well.
Agencies conducting "two-party" cases also often perform regulatory
enforcement functions. Moreover, personal experience has shown
that no agency which has issued an underlying administrative order,
currently on appeal, is ever completely disinterested in the outcome
at hearing. Employees who decide the case below often want to be
vindicated. Also, these cases frequently involve questions of the
interpretation, application, or even validity of agency administrative
rules. Agencies are very attentive indeed.
5. Panel Procedural Rules
Another problem faced by the study group was procedural
rules for the Panel. The result was yet one more compromise.
Almost all central panels write their own procedural rules;70 Oregon
took a different path. Discussion in the study group centered around
the use of the Attorney General's "model rules ' 71 for state contested
cases. These rules were specifically designed for "one-party"
regulatory cases; however, no agency was required to use them.72
Nonetheless, the Attorney General's representative advocated that
rules of procedure be standardized for Panel hearings, and that the
existing model rules serve as the basis for the Panel rules. 73  The
69. Id.
70. The central panels of Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, North
Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming write all their
own procedural rules. Central Panel Overview, supra note 58. The panels of
Colorado and Washington write rules for some agencies but not for others. Id. In
Michigan, each agency writes its own rules. Id.
The Model Central Panel Act is silent regarding the authority of the chief
administrative law judge to adopt procedural rules, despite the Commission's
preference for it to do so. McNeil, supra note 22, at 544. The American Bar
Association has proposed model rules for central panels: Model Administrative
Procedure Rules for Central Panel Agencies (State Practice and Procedure
Committee, National Conference of Administrative Law Judges, August 8, 1987).
71. OR. ADMIN. R. 137-003-0000 - 0092.
72. Heynderickx, supra note 1, at 258 n.154.
73. Id.
study group agreed. The Attorney General was authorized to write
the Panel's rules.74
A small committee of assistant attorneys general began
feverish work to have rules in place by January 1, 2000. In the late
fall of 1999 draft rules were submitted for public comment. There
was instant criticism. Agencies were concerned that they were too
complex and were designed more for formal litigation than for
informal administrative adjudication and dispute resolution. 7' The
private bar criticized the rules as imbalanced, favoring agencies over
citizens, especially in discovery. Both objections had some merit.
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, these rules have operated rather
effectively and even-handedly over the last three years.
6. Ex Parte Contacts
The issue of ex parte contact had been especially lively in
testimony over House Bill 2948 in 1997. That bill expressly
prohibited direct or indirect communication between an ALJ and any
other person on a legal or factual issue in the proceeding.76 Several
agencies were deeply worried that a prohibition against contact with
ALJs would force them to communicate only through their assistant
attorneys general. This would result in additional and unanticipated
costs, possibly requiring agencies to go back to the Legislature for
increased spending limitations.77 The Governor was even clearer: A
prohibition against ex parte contact would prevent agencies from
developing accurate technical facts necessary for complex cases.
Because the true goal of administrative hearings, in his mind, is to
provide a forum for the development of good policy, not for
74. House Bill 2948, by contrast, authorized the director of the office to write
procedural rules "[iun consultation with the Attorney General." H.R. 2948, 69th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997).
75. Michael Zimmer, Director of the Michigan Bureau of Hearings, reviewed
the procedural rules of twenty-two central panels (including those of Washington,
D.C.). Only four panels had more total pages of rules, and three had more rules
than Oregon. Although certainly unscientific, the study is nonetheless suggestive.
See Michael Zimmer, A Comparison of Rules (Dec. 2001) (on file with author).
76. H.R. 2948, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997).
77. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL OFFICE FOR H.R. 2948, supra note 22, at 2.
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competition, forbidding ex parte contacts would result in delays and
additional hearing costs. 78
House Bill 2525 approached the matter differently. Ex parte
contacts are not prohibited. Rather, ALJs are required to disclose on
the record the name of the person from whom the communication
was received, and then permit the other parties to respond.79
Notwithstanding this, at the inception of the Panel, both agencies and
ALJs alike were in a state of severe consternation. One agency went
so far as to cut off all e-mail and intranet service to the ALJs housed
in the agency for fear of unintended communications between ALJs
and agency staff (the service was soon restored). ALJs, for their part,
worried about inadvertently seeing letters from parties (especially pro
se litigants) after they had issued orders. All this anxiety proved
unnecessary. There have been few ex parte contacts. The "problem"
disappeared.
7. Modification of Hearing Officer Orders
The "heart" of House Bill 2525 is section 12, which
prescribes the conditions under which agencies may change ALJs'
proposed orders.80  House Bill 2948 had limited the ability of
agencies to alter findings to circumstances in which the AL's finding
was not supported by substantial evidence in the record.81 House Bill
2525 established two more lenient standards. 82 The more general
standard is a disclosure requirement. 83  It is applicable when an
agency changes a proposed order "in any substantial manner," and
requires the agency merely to "identify the modifications and provide
78. Hearing on H.R. 2948, supra note 23 (testimony of H. Henry Lazenby,
Governor's Legal Counsel).
79. H.R. 2525, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999).
80. Heynderickx, supra note 1, at 255. Of the total of roughly 29,000 orders
issued in 2001, only 592 were proposed orders. Hearing Officer Panel, Types of
Orders Issued, 2001 (on file with author). However, they tend to be the most
"political" because most are issued on behalf of licensing boards and commission.
Hearing Officer Panel, Types of Orders Issued, 2001 (on file with author).
81. H.R. 2948, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997).
82. H.R. 2525, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999).
83. Id.
an explanation to the parties to the hearing as to why the agency
made the modifications."' 84
The second standard is a limitation on findings of fact. This
had been a challenging problem for the study group. It wanted to
protect independent fact-finding by ALJs; on the other hand, it
wanted to protect agencies' policy-making role. The group's solution
was to distinguish "historical" facts from "predictive" facts. In trying
to understand the distinction, the study group puzzled over the
following riddle: Is a determination that air is unsafe for humans if it
contains more than x parts per million of particulate matter a
historical or predictive fact? The study group concluded that it is
predictive because of its policy nature, and that agencies should be
free to make such a finding.85 House Bill 2525 itself does not
mention "predictive facts;" rather, it speaks only to "historical
facts., 86 An agency may change findings of historical fact only if it
determines that the finding is not supported by a preponderance of
the evidence in the record.87 Changing "predictive facts" (i.e.,
interpretations of law) is presumably subject to the easier disclosure
requirement that the agency need only identify and explain the
change.
Judicial review of agency modification of proposed orders
was rather controversial within the study group. The general
standard of review under Oregon's Administrative Procedures Act is
for "substantial evidence," 88 a rather low one which arguably does
not offer much protection from capricious modification of ALJ fact-
finding by an agency. The study group decided that disputed
historical facts should be subject to de novo judicial review of the
84. Id. David Heynderickx commented that one of the reasons for this
requirement was the practice of some agencies to alter proposed orders without
notifying the parties. The Model Central Panel Act forbids agencies from
modifying, reversing, or remanding AU orders "except for specified reasons in
accordance with law," certainly an ambiguous limitation, if a limitation at all.
McNeil, supra note 22, §§ 1-11 at 547.
85. Heynderickx, supra note 1, at 258.
86. H.R. 2525, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999).
87. A "historical fact" is one in which the ALJ "determines that an event did or
did not occur in the past or that a circumstance or status did or did not exist either
before the hearing or at the time of the hearing." H.R. 2525, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Or. 1999).
88. OR. REv. STAT. § 183.482(8)(c) (2001).
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record as a whole.89 Although there was some concern that de novo
review would result in an increased use of judicial resources, the
group concluded that such instances would be rare. 90 Thus far, this
has proven to be correct.
In retrospect, the controversy over "historical" versus
"predictive" facts - driven by a fear that AUs would supplant their
own policy choices for those of agencies - was probably needless.
That has not happened. What has changed, however, is that agencies
are no longer completely free both to set policy and to decide
whether, under the facts, citizens have complied with that policy.
However, in some instances House Bill 2525 has not been quite the
deterrent to agency action as some had hoped. Subsection 12(2)
requires only that the agency identify and explain the modification.
Occasionally, that "explanation" can be rather casual (it is rarer for
agencies to alter findings of fact).
8. Oversight Committee
House Bill 2525 provided for the creation of an Oversight
Committee. It was the reflection of yet another political compromise.
Because the Panel was to be placed in the Employment Department,
Representative Shetterly was concerned that it might be entirely
"swallowed up" by the agency and its director. The Oversight
Committee was a way to prevent that and to provide a public forum
for the discussion of Panel operational issues.91
The Committee is composed of two members of the Senate,
two of the House of Representatives, two gubernatorial appointees,
two persons appointed by the attorney general, and the chief hearing
officer serving ex officio. 92 The Committee is charged with the tasks
of studying the "implementation and operation" of the Panel,
89. H.R. 2525, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999).
90. Heynderickx, supra note 1, at 257.
91. Email from Representative Lane Shetterly (September 28, 2002) (on file
with author).
92. H.R. 2525, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999). House Bill 2948 made no
provision for an advisory committee. See H.R. 2948, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or.
1997). The Model Central Panel Act proposes, as an optional provision, the
creation of a State Advisory Council on Administrative Hearings. McNeil, supra
note 22, §§ 1-12 at 547-48.
recommending to the governor and legislative assembly
improvements in the "effectiveness, fairness and efficiency" of Panel
operations, and suggesting additional legislation governing
operations. 93
The Committee has been chaired by Representative Shetterly,
sponsor of House Bill 2525 and its tireless champion. It met four
times in 2000 but only once in 2001. Meetings consisted primarily of
reports from the Chief Hearing Officer on implementation of House
Bill 2525. The pace of the Committee's work quickened somewhat in
2002 in preparation for the 2003 legislative session. The Committee
identified seven issues requiring study: whether or not the Panel
should be made permanent; who should appoint the chief hearing
officer (the governor or agency head); the nature of that appointment
(at will, for cause or term), structure of the Panel (independent and
stand-alone agency, independent agency but housed in another
agency for administrative support, or division of an agency), what
agencies should be subject to or exempted from House Bill 2525, title
of the chief hearing officer and name of the Panel (possibly "office of
administrative hearings"), and the role of the Oversight Committee in
2004 and beyond if the Panel is continued. A subcommittee was
created to review these matters and make recommendations to the
Committee at large.9
4
III. HEARING OFFICER PANEL OPERATIONS
A. Hearing Officer Panel Budget
1. Budget
On the passage of House Bill 2525, the six agencies that
transferred employees to the Employment Department were
instructed to estimate the current cost of supporting their respective
hearing units, and to transfer this money to the Employment
Department. The agencies' numbers were the product more of
intuition than of science, for few had ever separated out the cost of
hearings from other agency operating expenses. The total budget for
93. H.R. 2525, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999).
94. Minutes, Oversight Committee (March 21, 2002).
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the Panel was $20,163,680. 9' Of this, $2.1 million was projected for
indirect expenses (Panel administration and a charge by the
Employment Department for administrative support).96
Costs of the Panel were much less than feared. Start-up
expenses (incurred from September 1 to December 31, 1999) were
only $97,515, 7 not the $1 million estimated by House Bill 2948 in
1997. Attorney General expenses were also less: The Department of
Justice had anticipated that the more "formal process" of litigation
under House Bill 2525 would increase requests for attorney general
advice. It estimated that eleven additional positions (eight of which
were assistant attorneys general) would be needed, at a cost of $1.6
million for the 1999-01 biennium. 98 This fear did not materialize and
Department staffing was unaffected.
2. Billing
The Panel is funded principally by the "assessment" method.99
The Panel bills agencies based on their usage of hearing services
(ALJs and staff electronically record their time). Charges are
calculated either on the basis of "actual costs" or "hourly costs."
Agencies whose hearings needs equal or exceed one full-time AU
(there are eight such agencies) are billed actual costs--that is, salaries
plus benefits of all employees who work on their cases, and all other
costs directly associated with providing hearings for those agencies
("services and supplies"). In addition, the indirect costs of the Panel
95. 1999-2001 Legislatively Approved Budget (no date) (on file with author).
96. Fiscal Performance (September 7, 1999) (on file with author). This
number is somewhat misleading, for it suggests costs which, but for the creation of
the Panel, would not have been incurred. In fact, it includes the salaries of
administrators of the transferred hearings units, as well as other administrative
costs (e.g., personnel, budget and billing, information technology) now bome by
the Employment Department but not by the "sending" agencies.
97. Hearing Officer Panel Record (on file with author).
98. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL OFFICE, FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT OF PROPOSED
LEGISLATION, HB 2525A 5 (May 17, 1999).
99. There are three funding mechanisms for central panels: direct
appropriations (in Oregon, "General Funds"); assessment, by which agencies are
allocated their respective share of direct costs and overhead; and hourly billings.
Bruce H. Johnson, Methods of Funding Central Panels: The Fiscal, Management,
and Policy Implications, 20 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 301, 302 (2000).
(Panel administration and Employment Department administrative
support) are charged to those agencies in proportion to their monthly
usage of Panel services. Perhaps ninety percent of the Panel's
revenue is derived from billings based on actual costs. All other
agencies are billed on an hourly basis of $63.00 for ALJ time and
$40.00 for operational support staff time. This charge is calculated to
cover both direct and indirect costs.
The billing system depends upon ALJs and staff accurately
recording their time. Fortuitously, at the end of 1999, the
Employment Department had just developed a computerized time-
entry system. However, it was designed to meet federal auditing
requirements, not the billing needs of a central panel. Last-minute
modifications were needed to meet the Panel's start-up date of
January 1, 2000. But then, it was discovered that few employees
were able to access the Employment Department's time-entry system
because of the different internet and computer operating systems
used by Panel employees still housed in their respective agencies.
That was corrected. In the meantime, and in preparation for the
Panel's launch on January 1, 2000, an invoicing system, databases for
the collection of various statistical information, a cash flow report,
and an "aged accounts report" were all created.
In a billing system such as this, there is always a lag-time
between services provided, the invoicing for those services, and the
receipt of cash. This creates an operating deficit. The answer was to
require each of the "actual cost" agencies to make an advance
payment equal to an estimated three months' billings. In the last
three months of the biennium, billings would be credited against the
advance payment reserve, leaving (in a perfect world) a zero balance.
However, in late 1999 and early 2000 agencies refused to make
advance payments until interagency agreements were in place.
Negotiating these agreements was laborious and protracted, largely
because of the uncertainties (and, one must add, a degree of mistrust)
associated with the new central panel. The Employment Department
was forced to front the costs of the Panel with a loan of one million
dollars (repaid later). This provided the operating cash to cover the
deficit. In the next biennium (2001-03), the problem was more
manageable. Agencies by then had learned that working with the
Panel was not nearly as disagreeable as expected, and the Panel
proved not to be the horrible expense that was feared. Interagency
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agreements were negotiated smoothly, and advance payments were
made timely. There was no operating deficit. 100
One question, for which there will likely never be a
satisfactory answer, is the relative merits of the three different
funding mechanisms: direct appropriations, assessment, or hourly
billing.'' One criticism of the assessment and hourly billing systems
is that agencies, especially the smaller licensing boards and
commissions, might forego litigation in order to reduce costs,
particularly in the close cases. This may not be desirable from a
public policy point of view.10 2 On the other hand, scarce resources
can be the perfect incentive for triage. Moreover, there is no
evidence in Oregon that cases that should have gone to hearing did
not. Nor is there any evidence in Oregon of a public perception that
the Panel is under pressure to produce results favorable to the
agencies because they pay the bill. 103
In fact, the assessment method has operated very well for three
reasons. First, it is a fairly predictable source of revenue. When
billing by the hour, that hour must be case-specific; training and other
non-case-specific time must be included in the hourly rate. In an
assessment system, training and other panel activities are treated as
overhead and allocated to the agencies based on their respective use
of hearings services. Second, the assessment method (like hourly
billing) rationally apportions costs among agencies based on usage,
not unlike the free market itself. Agencies themselves decide how
much service they require. As caseloads in a particular subject
matter decline, AU and operational staff time are directed to other
areas of the Panel; the agency is not charged for services not used.
Conversely, as caseloads rise, the agency has to make some policy
choices over how many resources the agency can and should devote
100. House Bill 2525 was largely silent on issues relating to the funding of the
Panel, perhaps because of the Governor's previous reaction. By contrast, House
Bill 2948 had appropriated $1.6 million from the General Fund, and had directed
the Office to estimate at the beginning of every biennium the expenses it would
incur for the provision of hearing services and to bill each agency accordingly.
H.R. 2948, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997).
101. See Johnson, supra note 104, for an excellent discussion of this subject.
102. See Cokin & Mallamud, supra note 2, at 642. These commentators view
this form of billing as a "glaring negative feature" of the assessment method, and
therefore endorse direct appropriations as the preferable way to fund central panels.
103. See Johnson, supra note 104, at 305-06.
to litigation. (Of course, the larger the central panel, the more
flexible management can be in assigning work across subject
matters.) Third, agencies funded by direct appropriations are subject
to the closest, sometimes harshest, legislative scrutiny during tight
budgetary times. A central panel such as Oregon's, whose revenue
originates from a variety of sources-federal funds, licensing fees,
dedicated funds (e.g., highway), and the General Fund-is spared to
a degree.10 4
B. Assignment of Administrative Law Judges
1. Expertise
Prior to the Panel actually becoming operational, agencies
expressed genuine alarm that ALJs would be randomly assigned to
their cases. They feared that this would result in increased costs
because of the "learning curve" needed to become conversant with
their law. The provision in House Bill 2525, requiring the chief
hearing officer "whenever practicable, [to] assign a hearing officer
that has expertise in the legal issues or general subject matter of the
proceeding,"' 05 did little to allay anxiety. In the event, however, the
transition from December 31, 1999 to January 1, 2000 was seamless
for the overwhelming bulk of cases: ALJs transferred to the Panel
continued to hear the cases of their former parent agencies. Little
changed.
The problem was different and greater for those agencies that
had not transferred ALJs to the Panel, especially the occupational
licensing boards and commissions. They had historically used either
their own board members, or agency heads, or contract hearing
officers to preside over contested case hearings. Each believed, often
quite passionately, that its subject matter was more complex, more
mysterious perhaps, than that of any other agency. Panel
management greeted this with some (quiet) skepticism.
Nevertheless, perception trumps reality. In response, therefore, these
104. To the extent that there is a problem with the way in which Oregon's
panel is funded, the problem lies with the hourly billings. Only the very small
agencies are billed by the hour. They watch those billings closely. More than
once, management has had to write-off excessive time billed by ALJs.
105. H.R. 2525, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999).
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agencies were aligned into eight divisions (for example, Natural
Resources, Construction, Health Licensing) based on related subject
matter. Small teams of hearing officers were assigned to each
division, and within the teams ALJs were assigned to specific
agencies where possible. The underlying notion (and what was
advertised) was that agencies in each division shared a common
vocabulary and regulatory practice. Expertise in one was readily
transferable to others in the same division. Formation of the teams
would promote expertise and reduce costs. Like other worries, the
concern about limited expertise in the various areas too soon went
away.
Related to this is the interesting question of generalists versus
specialists.10 6 At least one central panel encourages cross-training in
all agency cases. 10 7 Oregon's approach is different. Management
does encourage cross-training, but not for everyone and not in
everything. There are several reasons. Not all ALJs are confident
trying a variety of cases. Not all ALJs are adept at mastering a
variety of different law. Efficiency declines, moreover, when ALJs
move between too many subject matters, especially when the subject
matters have complex statutory or regulatory legal schemes. Finally,
there is a "political" problem with promoting generalists, at least for a
young panel such as that of Oregon having to prove itself: agencies
suffer over the thought of "non experts" handling their cases.
1 0 8
Instead, Panel management encourages specialization in one or two
large areas (e.g., motor vehicle licensing, social services, and liquor
control) and then gradual exposure to other areas, depending on
interest and aptitude.
106. See generally Symposium, This Year's Reform is Next Year's Need for
Reform, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 587 (1984).
107. Hardwicke, The Central Hearing Agency, supra note 2, at 32.
108. See the comment of Bruce H. Johnson for the argument that treating all
ALJs as generalists undermines agency confidence in the administrative law
process. Bruce H. Johnson, Strengthening Professionalism Within an
Administrative Hearing Office: The Minnesota Experience, 53 ADMIN. L. REV.
445, 451 n.30 (2001). The better course, Johnson urges, is to assign ALJs with
expertise in the subject matter, and to provide other ALJs with opportunities to
acquire expertise. Id.
Another issue is that of attorney versus non attorney ALJs. 0 9
None of the minimum qualifications for ALJs, inherited from the
original agencies, affirmatively requires either graduation from law
school or a bar license, although perhaps eighty percent meet either
one or both standards.1 10 Understandably, this is a sensitive issue-
those with law degrees believe that the value of their education is
diminished by the fact that a degree is not required; those without
believe that the value of their skills is diminished by those who
believe a law degree is necessary.
There is no clear answer. Some ALJs without law degrees
perform exceptionally well in their particular subject matter. Some
ALJs with law degrees occasionally perform questionably.
Nonetheless, there is a persuasive argument that minimum
qualifications for ALJs should include either a current or past bar
license, and perhaps some minimum years of practice. There are
several reasons. Persons who have actually practiced law can be
trained more quickly in how to conduct a hearing. They already
understand procedure, motion practice, evidence, and so forth. They
can be cross-trained in different subject matters more readily because
they are accustomed to working in different areas of law: perhaps a
contract case in the early morning; later in the day, a domestic
relations question; later yet, a tort case. In Oregon's Panel, persons
who have not practiced are, in general, the least eager to move
between subject matters; they prefer to remain in their specialty.
Attorneys-by virtue of their law school training and practice-have
109. Of twenty-two state central panels surveyed, only Oregon does not
require ALJs to be bar-licensed. Central Panel Overview, supra note 58. The
Model Central Panel Act recommends that admission to practice law be a minimum
qualification of central panel ALJs; optional requirements are admission in the state
of the central panel and admission for a minimum of five years. McNeil, supra
note 22, at 544. The Model State Administrative Procedure Act recommends that
ALJs be admitted to practice law, but this is an option. MODEL STATE ADM1N.
PROC. ACT, 15 U.L.A. § 4-301(b) (1981).
110. Only the chief hearing officer is required to be an active member of the
Oregon State Bar. H.R. 2525, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999). The reason is the
legislative belief that the chief hearing officer should have a strong background in
procedural rules, evidence, and conduct of hearings. Interview with Neil Bryant,
supra note 17. The Model Central Panel Act recommends licensure by the central
panel's state bar for a minimum of five years. McNeil, supra note 22, §§ 1-4 at
543. Three years experience as Chief Hearing Officer of Oregon has certainly
shown the value of having practiced law.
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confronted a greater variety of legal issues than those persons with
law degrees but who have never practiced. A bar license enhances
the professional image of a central panel. And, finally, attorneys and
their clients have an expectation that the judge is licensed by the bar.
They are often disagreeably surprised when they discover that is not
the case. 1 '
2. Recusal
An interesting feature of House Bill 2525 is the peremptory
right of a party or agency to recuse an AU assigned to a case; the
requester must show "good cause" for the second request.''
2
Initially, Panel management was apprehensive that it would face a
deluge of recusal requests on January 1, 2000. In anticipation, the
first rule adopted by the Panel in December 1999 set rather strict
timelines for making such requests. 113 Fears proved groundless,
however, as recusal requests were very infrequent. At the end of the
year, the rule was substantially relaxed.
3. Hiring and Training
Management recognized from the beginning that the success of
the Panel depended in large measure upon sound hiring practices. A
new screening process was instituted. All applicants for AU
positions are given a fictitious fact situation, statutes, rules, and a
couple of appellate decisions. They are asked to write a proposed
order addressing three or four issues. These writing samples are then
evaluated anonymously for clarity of writing and quality of legal
analysis. Successful applicants are invited for interviews (in general,
one out of three applicants are interviewed). This has been a
I1l. Cokin & Mallamud, supra note 2, at 635 (recommend that ALJs be
attorneys). The chief hearing officer does have the authority to establish the
minimum qualifications for ALJs. H.R. 2525, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999).
This is a decision that must wait until completion of the "pilot" phase of the Panel.
Id.
112. Id.
113. OR. ADMIN. R. 471-060-0005 (1999).
remarkably successful device to ensure that only qualified persons
are hired. 114
Training is an important feature of House Bill 2525.' 15 The
challenge was, and is, to produce training that is both efficient and
effective. This is probably easier for central panels with relatively
few ALJs, all of whom sit in the same place. It is tougher for a panel
such as Oregon's with eighty ALJs scattered throughout the state.
Bringing this many people together for a single day of training may
be efficient and may help promote Panel solidarity. But, it is not
especially effective-attention, interaction, and genuine learning are
all diminished.
Panel management and a small group of ALJs designed a
comprehensive curriculum of administrative law. Every conceivable
subject is listed. Much like a buffet dinner, the purpose is to pick and
choose what to serve without fear of overlooking anything. The
more difficult question is how to deliver the training. Both
management and the AU committee agreed that training in small
groups is more effective than in large ones. But it is also less
efficient. The Panel is experimenting with the following mix of
tools: videotapes, CDs overlaid with voice, written materials, self-
study, and in-person classrooms. All-panel training will continue to
occur, but less often and with more emphasis on building
organizational cohesiveness.
One of the more effective training tools for Panel ALJs has
been the "Model Proposed Order" and the "Model Disorder" (a name
suggested by an especially creative AU). Both are fictitious cases
from imaginary boards. The Model Proposed Order represents
everything that an excellent order should be. The Model Disorder,
114. Hiring has not been without its complications, however. The Panel
inherited four different civil service classifications, two pay ranges (for the same
work), and two unions from the consolidated hearing units.
115. See H.R. 2525, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999) (requiring the chief
hearing officer to "design and implement a standards and training program for
hearing officers on the panel and for persons seeking to serve as hearing officers on
the panel"). For more on this subject, see J. W. Maurer & M.B. Lepp, Hiring,
Training and Retention of Administrative Law Judges in Central Panel States, 7 J.
NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 5 (1987); Kenneth Nickolai, Strengthening the
Skills of Administrative Law Judges, 20 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 263
(2000).
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by contrast, represents everything that an excellent order should not
be. Both use pedagogical endnotes, where the trainee can find
explanations for the points being made. ALJs greeted the concept
without a great deal of enthusiasm when it was introduced, but a year
later, opinion shifted. These orders have succeeded far beyond
management's expectations in improving-even remarkably
improving-the quality of Panel proposed orders. Model orders and
model disorders are now being developed for specific subject
matters.
Training in specialized subject matters (such as special
education, motor vehicle licensing, and so forth) is a related but
different problem. Prior to Panel, hearing units offered either no
formal training at all or, more commonly, training lasting one to two
weeks with binders three inches thick. The former was too little.
The latter was too much. Extensive training programs in particular
subject matters also discourage internal cross-training because of lost
productivity and the resources needed for the training itself. Also,
tracing the consequence further, the failure to cross-train thwarts one
of the key advantages of a central panel: the ability to nimbly assign
ALJs between different programs in order to address fluctuating case
loads.
The Panel is now experimenting with a new concept of cross-
training. It focuses on the "bread and butter" areas of law within any
particular subject matter (e.g., "separation" in unemployment
insurance; breath test/breath test refusals in implied consent). It
assumes that the trainee is an experienced AU. The training lasts no
more than a single day and has the limited goal of producing a
working knowledge, not mastery, of the subject matter, sufficient that
the AU can competently develop the necessary record with the aid of
a "hearing guide." The AU is provided with a "hearing guide" for
every issue or claim within the area of law. This guide sets out all
the necessary elements, a script with recommended questions, and a
"model order" that demonstrates by example what a quality decision
should look like.
C. Decisional Independence and Quality Assurance
One of the more vexing issues faced by management was the
conflict between AU decisional independence and ensuring quality
decision-making. 116 The problem was especially critical in the
occupational licensing cases of boards and commissions. Although
representing no more than one percent of the total number of Panel
orders, they were (and are) the most politically sensitive. The
difficulty was that most Panel ALJs came from agencies whose
hearings and orders were subject to strict and compressed timelines
imposed by federal or state law. There is little time to reflect. One
finds a statute or rule, applies it, and then moves on quickly to the
next case. The interstices of the law are filled more by intuition
rather than by legal research (indeed, at the beginning of the Panel
only a small percentage of ALJs had access to any legal research
tools at all; that has since been corrected). Moreover, oftentimes a
certain staleness sets in, and a commensurate decline in the quality of
work occurs, when an ALJ handles the same kind of cases year-in
and year-out. 1
7
Then, suddenly, these same ALJs were being assigned
licensing cases, among others, with different law and unfamiliar
issues. Not surprisingly, they applied the same methodology: find a
statute or rule, apply it; rely on one's intuition when the statute or
rule fails to directly answer the question; and then move on to the
next case. This practice, unavoidable for the high-volume cases,
produced quite questionable results for licensing cases.
116. Much has been written on this subject. See, e.g., Edwin L. Felter, Jr.,
Maintaining the Balance Between Judicial Independence and Judicial
Accountability in Administrative Law, 17 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 89
(1997); R. Terrence Harders, Striking A Balance: Administrative Law Judge
Independence and Accountability, 19 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1 (1999);
Arthur Fried & Ronald G. Bernoski, Panel Discussion on Independence and the
Federal ALl. Fried, Bernoski, 18 J. NAT'L ASs'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 47 (1998);
Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986); Penny J. White,
Judicial Courage and Judicial Independence, 16 J. NAT'L ASs'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES
161 (1996); Ronnie A. Yoder & John Hardwicke, Yoder-Hardwicke Dialogue:
Does Mandatory Quality Assurance Oversight of ALl Decisions Violate ALI
Decisional Independence, Due Process, or Ex Parte Prohibitions?, 17 J. NAT'L
Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 75 (1997); Ann Marshall Young, Evaluation of
Administrative Laws Judges: Premises, Means, and Ends, 17 J. NAT'L ASS'N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1 (1997); Ann Marshall Young, Judicial Independence in
Administrative Adjudication: Past, Present, and Future, 19 J. NAT'L ASS'N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 101 (1999).
117. See Cokin & Mallamud, supra note 2, at 627.
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After several months, it became clear that changes were
necessary. Three were made. First, no order for the licensing boards
or commissions issued without management review for legal
sufficiency-that is, the conclusions of law needed to be supported
by the findings of fact; relevant law must be applied; the relevant law
must be applied reasonably; and, finally, outcome was not
considered. Second, these cases were assigned to ALJs who were
especially adept at managing the different legal issues presented by
these cases. Third, ALJs were required to write their orders applying
the standards set out in the model proposed order (discussed above).
In 2001, OAALJ raised with Panel management concerns
about the appropriateness of pre-issuance management review.
OAALJ understood the importance of accurate decision-making. It
also conceded that management was zealous in avoiding review for
outcome as opposed to legal sufficiency. OAAJL's principal concern
was one of appearance. The issue was legitimate. It was also timely,
inasmuch as the quality of proposed orders had improved so greatly
that management review had become perfunctory.
A committee was formed with representation from OAALJ, the
AU community at large (two of the three ALJs came from outside
the Panel), and the Oregon State Bar. After several meetings, the
committee proposed a form of peer review. In sum, it recommended
that two peer reviewers be appointed. They would review for both
quality assurance and legal sufficiency (written standards have been
established for both). Every order issues as written unless both
reviewers conclude that the order is legally insufficient and the
author refuses to make the necessary changes. If this occurs, the case
is reassigned to a different AU who reviews the entire record and
writes a draft order for peer review. In the meantime, a copy of the
rejected order is sent to the parties in the Notice of Reassignment.
Panel management accepted this recommendation. " 8
118. For more on peer review, see Robert Robinson Gales, The Peer Review
Process in Administrative Adjudication, 21 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 56
(2001). At the time of writing, there was too little experience with this process to
report either success or failure.
V. EFFICIENCY AND PROFESSIONALISM
A. Efficiency
Oregon's central panel has produced considerable savings for the
state of Oregon over the last three years. In 2000, the average
number of hours per referral per ALJ was 4.01; in 2001, it had
declined to 3.80; in 2002, it declined further to 3.56.119 This is an
efficiency improvement of eleven percent between 2000 and 2002.
Improved efficiency translates into lower unit costs. The average
cost of a referral in 2000 was $292.12° In 2002, it had dropped by
$15 to $277.121 The number of referrals in 2002 was 37,400.122 This
represents a savings in 2002 alone of $560,000; over a biennium, if
referrals remained steady, it would be $1,120,000. For the biennium
2001-03, the Panel will be $1.6 million under the amount budgeted
by agencies for hearings. Panel management expects to reduce the
number of FTEs by at least eight, perhaps ten, in the next biennium.
There are two reasons for these reduced costs. The first is that
generally, the larger the central panel, the more capacity it has to
absorb work-there are just more people available to do it. For
example, when the Panel became operational on January 1, 2000,
five fewer employees (two managers and three ALJs) were
transferred to it than were handling hearings on December 31, 1999.
Those positions were eliminated and the work was easily absorbed,
resulting in a savings of over $900,000.
The second reason for reduced costs is different. Experience in
Oregon has shown that separate and independent hearings units-
especially small hearing units-are inherently inefficient and costly.
Again, the explanation is simple: caseloads fluctuate. The work
never precisely equals the staff to manage it. If the work diminishes,
there is capacity. If it increases, say, to 1.3 FTEs, two employees are
hired. Again, there is capacity. Here are three examples: 1
23




123. Estimated savings are based on salary and benefits in the biennium 200 1-
03. These numbers are conservative, because they do not include other associated
expenses ("services and supplies"). All of this data is on file with the author.
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* The Water Resources Department transferred one AU to
the Panel, but it had only .33 FTE worth of work. Seventy
percent of that AL's time was assigned to the Department
of Human Services cases. This saved the Water Resources
Department over $96,000. The next year, complex water
rights litigation developed, requiring another 1.75 FTE
worth of work, for a total of 2.08. To avoid a backlog, the
Department would have had to hire another two ALJs.
With the Panel, however, the additional work was absorbed
without hiring more staff.
" The Department of Consumer and Business Services
("DCBS") transferred six persons: four ALJs and two
clerical staff. However, it had only 3.75 FTE worth of
work. At one time, no doubt, that entire staff was needed.
But the number of DCBS hearings declined over time; the
number of ALJs did not. That capacity (2.25 FTEs) was
used in other parts of the Panel. This saved the
Department over $360,000.
* The Oregon Liquor Control Commission transferred three
ALJs and one clerical staff, but it had only 3.3 FTE worth
of work. One AU was assigned to Division of Child
Support cases, which had developed a backlog because
ALJs formerly handling those cases were assigned
unemployment insurance cases, which had grown
considerably with the recession. This saved the
Commission $112,000.
B. Professionalism
A central panel is not just about efficiency but also about
quality and professionalism. A Code of Ethics was adopted.'24
124. Credit goes to OAALJ for drafting the Code. However, because
performance standards in Oregon are set by civil service laws and union contract,
the Code is expressly "aspirational" only. Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Special Problems of
State Administrative Law Judges, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 403, 408-410 (2001), has
surveyed the codes of ethics used by state central panels; see also Bruce H.
Johnson, Strengthening Professionalism Within an Administrative Hearing Office:
Training for some hearings units consolidated into the Panel was
nonexistent prior to 2000. It has assumed new importance today.
Standards of conduct for hearings and the writing of decisions have
increased. As standards have increased, so has the quality of
hearings and decisions. There is a greater sense of professionalism.
Before, an ALJ was merely the employee of one of many agency
hearing units. Today, ALJ is part of an organization known to the
legislature, the state bar, and to agency heads.
VI. CONCLUSION
The story of Oregon's central panel is no different from that of
most other central panels. Agency heads fiercely and emotionally
resisted House Bill 2525. There were predictions of ALJs running
amok with agency statutes and rules; cost overruns; pestilence and
famine. Their dire predictions were continuous, insistent, and often
extreme.
But by 2002, the earth had not tilted off its axis. Agencies
continue to make policy and they continue to apply their expertise.
The only difference is that agency policy and expertise are now
tested by independent judges. 125 Indeed, some agencies, formerly
opponents, today support making the Panel permanent. The costs
have been much less than feared. They have come to see the
advantage of separating their adjudicatory from their regulatory
function. Orders are timelier and, for some, the orders are of a higher
quality than before. However, those agencies which formerly used
their own executive directors or board members to preside over
hearings continue to resist-it costs them more, but they especially
have lost control. This resistance, however, is proof of the need for a
central panel. For the first time, Oregon citizens have an opportunity
to adjudicate their disputes with agencies before judges who are truly
independent and impartial. This is not simply good government. It is
best government.
The Minnesota Experience, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 445, 462-70 (2001) for an
interesting discussion of the development of a Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Minnesota central panel (Office of Administrative Hearings).
125. John Hardwicke said it well: "The true governmental process [due
process] . . . should no longer be protected by the 'mystique' of expertise."
Hardwicke, The Central Hearing Agency, supra note 2, at 60.
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The challenge of transforming seven hearing units into a
consolidated central panel, ready for operation on January 1, 2000,
was daunting, at least in retrospect. Most central panels in this
country have perhaps ten to 15 administrative law judges-a
relatively large one has 40. Oregon, with 80, was the largest in the
country in 2000-01.126 There were many problems to address and to
solve. 127
Of course, almost three years later, the Panel continues to have
problems but very much has been accomplished. It would not have
been but for the skill, dedication, and patience of all of the Panel's
administrative law judges and operational support staff. It is to them
that this article is gratefully and respectfully dedicated.
126. See Central Panel Overview, supra note 58.
127. A personal comment: When I was appointed on August 31, 1999, I felt
that I had entered a dense, impenetrable fog. There was so much to learn, so much
to do. I did not know where to begin. Quite by chance, I learned of the existence
of an annual conference of directors and chief ALJs of central panels. By
remarkably good fortune, the conference was scheduled to meet two weeks later in
Madison, Wisconsin, hosted by David Schwartz, Administrator of the Division of
Hearings and Appeals. For three days, I listened intently, took voluminous notes,
and asked endless questions. The fog lifted. I doubt it would have but for the
guidance and advice of my colleagues. I continue to rely upon them.
